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ABSTRACT: 
John Baconthorpe (c.1290-1345/8) was the best-known of the Carmelite scholastics in the 
Middle Ages. This article is a brief study of his solution to the philosophical problem of how 
the soul may be wholly present in the human body and present whole and undivided in each 
part. Baconthorpe’s account is of great interest for a number of reasons. He takes issue with 
one of his fellow Carmelite masters, alerting us to diversity of opinion within that ‘school’. 
Furthermore, in using terminology and illustrative analogies drawn from terminist logic and 
the mathematical sciences, Baconthorpe is an important witness to what has been described as 
the ‘mathematization’ of philosophy and theology in late medieval England. Finally, study of 
Baconthorpe’s texts provides further evidence of the emergence of the theme of extension in 
fourteenth-century thought in which we can discern the roots of modern philosophical 
debate. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In Plato’s Phaedrus Socrates declares: ‘to describe what the soul actually is would 
require a long account, altogether a task for a god in every way.’100 Unperturbed, 
many thinkers over the ages have attempted this ‘god-like’ task of giving a 
philosophical account of the soul and, more particularly, its relationship to the body. 
 In the late Middle Ages much of the philosophical discussion concerning the 
relationship between the soul and the body concerned itself with three problems. 
First, there was the interaction problem: how do soul and body interact with one 
another in a causal way given they are such different substances? Secondly, there was 
the unification problem: how could soul and body, such apparently separate and 
diverse substances, be united under the identity of a unique and unified entity such as, 
for example, a human being? Thirdly, there was the extension problem: how could the 
soul, as the form of the body, be present as a whole in every part of the body without 
being subject to spatial extension? 
 In the early fourteenth-century thinkers placed particular emphasis on the 
extension problem and considered it within the context of a wider concern to 
articulate a metaphysics of presence. The challenge to Eucharistic theology to give an 
account of the natural extension of Christ’s body which is manifestly not 
circumscribed in the Sacrament was seen to be analogous to the difficulty of 
explaining how the soul is present in the body in a dynamic way without itself being 
spatially extended.
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For many late medieval thinkers the key to dealing with such problems of presence 
and extension was to posit a forma corporeitatis or ‘corporeal form’ in addition to the 
rational soul and thereby insist upon a plurality of substantial form in the human 
being. Some kind of form of the body or of ‘bodiliness’ was considered necessary to 
underscore the theological doctrines of the resurrection and the cult of relics; the 
issue was that of asserting the numerical identity of the human body through life, 
death and resurrection. In time to assert the contrary position and to insist (along 
with a thinker such as Thomas Aquinas (d.1274)) on the unicity of substantial form 
was to incur official censure. Although a condemnation of the unicity theory is absent 
from the Parisian condemnation of 1277, Archbishop of Canterbury, John Peckham’s 
1286 condemnation explicitly targeted it.
102
 
The subject of this article, the Carmelite John Baconthorpe, conforms to the 
plurality thesis in relation to substantial form. There is nothing remarkable about this 
but what is interesting is the way in which he sees the potential in the plurality thesis 
for extricating the rational soul from issues of spatial extension. Equally intriguing are 
the kind of analogies Baconthorpe employs in his attempt to solve the extension 
problem by explaining the way in which the rational soul may be wholly present as 
form of the body and present as a whole in every part of the human being. 
 Study of John Baconthorpe on soul, body and extension is important for a 
number of reasons. First, paying attention to early Carmelite scholastics such as 
Baconthorpe is an indispensible part of the current move among scholars of medieval 
philosophy to deepen our understanding of the intellectual history of the early 
fourteenth-century, thus moving away from the ‘Gilsonian paradigm’ of thirteenth-
century superiority. Secondly, reading Baconthorpe on the relationship between body 
and soul provides us with an example of early dispute among Carmelite doctors: 
Baconthorpe takes issue with the views of Gerard of Bologna, first Carmelite doctor 
at the University of Paris and former Prior General of the Order, who advocated the 
unicity of substantial form in human beings. Thirdly, Baconthorpe is an important 
witness to a discernible change in philosophical terminology which takes place at the 
beginning of the fourteenth century. Philosophical discussions of the period become 
replete with ‘extension-type’ language. Previously there was ample discussion 
concerning quantity, the subject of quantity, quantity’s role in individuation and the 
relationship between whole and parts. The fourteenth-century focus in thought and 
in terminology on issues of extension helps to build up a picture of very real 
continuity of discussion in medieval, Renaissance and modern thought.
103
 Fourthly, 
reading Baconthorpe’s discussion of soul body and extension is a contribution to the 
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wider medieval preoccupation with the metaphysics of presence. Fifthly, 
Baconthorpe’s style of argumentation, employing as it does terminology and 
illustrative examples from ‘the exact sciences’ (such as geometry) gives us some 
insight into the way English theologians liked to do their theology with their strong 
background in the mathematical sciences. In short, Baconthorpe is an important 
witness to what William Courtenay has described as the ‘mathematisation of 
theology’ in England in the late medieval period; it will be noted later in this article 
that the terminology the Carmelite master employs shows a certain affinity with that 
of the Oxford Mertonists.
104
 Finally, reading Baconthorpe helps us to trace the impact 
of the Condemnations of 1277 and 1286 on the subsequent development of thought. 
 After a brief presentation of the life and work of Baconthorpe, some 
consideration will be given to the position of Gerard of Bologna since Baconthorpe 
articulates his own views in reaction to those of his Carmelite confrere. Then 
Baconthorpe’s solution to the problem of soul, body and extension will be presented 
and followed by some concluding remarks. 
 
 
1. John Baconthorpe 
 
The best-known of the early Carmelite scholastics, John Baconthorpe, was born in 
England around 1290.
105
 In the past scholars have suggested that he read the Sentences 
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of Peter Lombard at Paris before 1318. However, recent scholarship proposes 1320-
21 as a more likely dating. Baconthorpe had incepted as master in the theology faculty 
at Paris by 1323.
106
 He edited his commentary on the Sentences around 1325.  
Baconthorpe’s three sets of Quaestiones quodlibetales were disputed from 1323 to 
1325 and in 1330: Quodlibet I (1323-1324), Quodlibet II (1324-1325), Quodlibet III 
(1330). He produced a second redaction of his commentary on book IV of the 
Sentences around 1340. Baconthorpe was Prior Provincial of the Carmelites in 
England from 1327 (possibly 1326) to 1333 and taught at Cambridge and probably at 
Oxford. He died around 1348 (possibly of Plague). Baconthorpe’s teaching was so 
highly regarded in his order that both his Sentences commentary and his Quodlibeta 
were printed several times in the early modern era. Indeed by the seventeenth century 
he had effectively become the ‘official’ theologian of the Carmelites. Key to his status 
as preeminent Carmelite theologian was his defence of the doctrine of the 
Immaculate Conception and his writings concerning the history and spiritual 
tradition of his order and the importance of its early thirteenth-century Rule. Later 
English Carmelite scholastics, Osbert Pickenham (late 14
th
 century) and Richard 
Lavenham (d. 1399), both cite a commentary on Aristotle’s De anima by 
Baconthorpe but this is not known to survive.
107
 
In common with other early Carmelite scholastics, Baconthorpe reveals 
himself to be a consistent if somewhat eclectic thinker. His own thinking is most 
often developed in dialogue with the thought of major figures such as Henry of 
Ghent (c.1217-1293), John Duns Scotus (c.1266-1308) and Peter Auriol (c.1280-
1322). Baconthorpe frequently takes issue with Thomas Aquinas and both presents 
and criticises key doctrines of Giles of Rome (c.1247-1316) and Godfrey of Fontaines 
(c.1250-1304). Baconthorpe was an opponens of Thomas Bradwardine (c.1290-1349), 
specifically on the issue of freewill and predestination. An interesting aspect of his 
work is Baconthorpe’s willingness to engage critically with the thought of other 
Carmelite scholastics such as Gerard of Bologna (d.1317) and his one-time Carmelite 
teachers at Paris and Oxford, Guido Terreni (d.1342) and Robert Walsingham 
(d.1313).   
Throughout his work Baconthorpe is keen to present himself as a true 
interpreter of Aristotle. Frequently he is content to settle an argument secundum 
Philosophum without much supporting theological discussion; the text we will refer 
to later is a classic example of this. Another characteristic of Baconthorpe’s thinking 
is his tendency to conclude his arguments at key points with the aid of Averroes’s 
commentaries. This led to his being given the rather exaggerated title Princeps 
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Averroistarum in sixteenth-century Padua in the Libellus de immortalitate animae of 
Agostino Nifo (c.1469-1538).
108
 It has to be said that Baconthorpe’s title as ‘Prince 
[or ‘chief’] of the Averroists’ has little really to do with his overall doctrinal 
affiliations and is more a recognition of his skill in explaining the doctrine of 
Averroes, particularly concerning the unique intellect. Baconthorpe’s undeniable 
eclecticism may deny to his works the last degree of originality but it does give rise to 
a strong positive commitment on his part to the meticulous presentation of the 
opinions of other scholastics in preparation for declaring his own position. For this 
reason Baconthorpe’s works are highly significant for the insight they afford into the 
state of philosophical and theological debate in the early fourteenth century. 
 
 
2. Gerard of Bologna 
 
Baconthorpe articulates his own views on soul, body and extension in reaction to the 
views of an earlier Carmelite scholastic, Gerard of Bologna, the first Carmelite master 
at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages, who incepts in 1295, becoming Prior 
General of the Order in 1297.
109
 Unlike Baconthorpe, Gerard advocated the unicity of 
substantial form; in other words, he does not argue for corporeal form in addition to 
the rational soul. However, this led him to be wonder whether this might not lead 
one to having to say that the rational soul, as unique form of the body in human 
beings, is in some way extended along with the extension of matter, quantity being 
one of the Aristotelian categories of accident. Gerard deals with the issue in his 
Quodlibet II, q. 19 (c.1307) and (at considerable length) in Quodlibet III, q. 7 (c. 
1308). His ultimate position is agnostic: he can see plenty of arguments for the 
position that the soul might be extended per accidens but is completely at a loss to 
determine the issue. 
 Gerard’s position attracted significant contemporary comment. He was 
strongly opposed on the issue by the Dominican Hervaeus Natalis (c.1250-1323), an 
early promotor of the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas within his Order.
110
 In addition, 
the anonymous Scotist of Vat. Lat. 869 is an important source for contemporary 
reaction to Gerard’s doctrine concerning the soul.111 This author claims to have heard 
(audivi) Gerard of Bologna and Francis Caracciolo, the Chancellor of the University 
of Paris from 1309 to 1316, maintain that the rational soul is extended per accidens 
and that, furthermore, the contrary can only be held as a matter of faith. The author 
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clearly considers such a conclusion results from a denial of plurality of substantial 
form (supposito quod in homine non sit nisi una forma sola).
112
 
 Later the author goes on to say that another doctor thought that Gerard’s 
position on the extension of the soul was heretical: Sed contra istos doctores invehebat 
unus alius doctor, dicens quod illud erat periculose dictum et sapiebat heresim, videbatur 
enim declinare ad opinionem Commentatoris, qui posuit animam intellectivam esse 
corpoream.
113
 (‘But against those doctors one other doctor went on the attack, saying 
that this was a dangerous opinion and that it smacked of heresy and seemed to decline 
unto the opinion of Averroes who held the rational soul to be corporeal.’) 
 
 
3. Baconthorpe’s Solution  
 
Our text comes from Baconthorpe’s redacted commentary on Book III of the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard (In Tertium Sent., d. 18, q. 1, 1-3).
114
 As we suggested 
previously, it may be dated to somewhere around 1325. It comes in the form of a 
quaestio divided into three articles. Here Baconthorpe sets out explicitly to counter 
the opinion of his Carmelite predecessor, Gerard of Bologna, that the soul might be 
accidentally extended and suggests ways one might argue philosophically for the 
presence of the soul as whole in whole and whole in each part. Baconthorpe’s general 
approach will be to insist that corporeal form (forma corporeitatis) together with 
prime matter can ‘take care of’ issues of spatial extension, leaving the rational soul to 
fulfil its ‘higher calling’ to extend itself as a power in the human body, a power which 
is whole in the whole and whole in each part. 
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Article 1 
The first article sets out to answer the question of whether the rational soul may be 
the substantial form of every part of the human body and of the whole human body 
and not be spatially extended. 
Turning to the opinions of his Carmelite predecessor, Gerard of Bologna, 
Baconthorpe argues his own position. He declares: ‘I concede that the whole 
composite, which is subjected to quantity and informed by it, namely the human 
being, is extended accidentally.’115 So it is the human being as a whole, as a unified 
composite of matter and form, body and soul, that can be said to be extended 
accidentally. He goes on to insist that the only parts of that composite that are really 
extended accidentally are matter together with corporeal form: 
 
And when it is said that essential parts are also extended accidentally, I say that that 
essential part which is the proximate and immediate principle of accepting extension 
(namely, matter together with the corporeal form) is extended accidentally, and this 
part which is the first and principal ratio of receiving extension is not extended 
accidentally in reality but only equipollently, namely in so far as equally truly it is in 
each part of extended matter.
116
 
 
The use of the term ‘equipollently’ is unusual here.  ‘Equipollence’ is a common term 
in the terminist logic of the late medieval period and has to do with the equivalence 
and convertability of propositions (equipollentia propositionum).
117
 Here the 
Carmelite master is employing the term in a metaphysical-psychological context to 
mean that the soul is of equal ‘power’ in the whole body and in each and every part of 
the body in which it is present. Here we have a fine example of the tendency among 
English scholars in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to introduce terminology 
from terminist logic and the exact sciences into philosophical and theological 
discourse. 
 
Matter and corporeal form are the proximate and immediate rationes of receiving 
extension. But there is, Baconthorpe argues, a prior first and principal ratio, namely 
the rational soul, which more remotely might be said to receive extension but does 
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not do so in reality (realiter) but only equipollently. The rational soul is whole and 
whole in every part of extended matter. In other words, Baconthorpe is trying to 
argue that the rational soul as the principle of life of the whole human composite of 
body and soul is whole and whole in every part and is in this way extended. But it is 
not spatially extended.  Such spatial extension or quantity is, for Baconthorpe, ‘taken 
care of’ by matter and corporeal form. 
 Next Baconthorpe considers the suggestion of Gerard that the whole human 
being is extended: totus homo est extensus. Here he more or less repeats the same 
argumentation as above in response to the question in quo recipitur quantitas? (‘in 
what is quantity received?’): 
 
I concede that the whole human being is extended and when it is asked what is 
quantity received in, I say [it is received] in the composite as informed by corporeal 
form.  And when it is argued that accordingly the form is extended I say that this is 
true with regard to that which is the proximate and immediate ratio of receiving 
extension but this does not apply to a form if it is a first and principal [form].  Again 
it is by equipollence that [the form] may be in each extended part of the composite.
118
 
 
Again, Baconthorpe insists that the rational soul is wholly present in the whole and 
whole in every part without being accidentally extended realiter (‘in fact’). The 
rational soul is the first and principal form of the body. It is in this way remote. 
Corporeal form together with matter are the proximate and immediate rationes of 
receiving extension; that is what they are fitted to do. 
The Carmelite master advances several other arguments along the same lines. 
He talks of a newly-created hand – part of the human composite. The hand lives (‘is 
alive’) by means of the rational soul which precedes it, not in a way that the soul 
freshly (noviter) pours itself into the hand, but in such a way as it extends itself 
through the totality, so that it may be whole in individual parts. Furthermore, with an 
acknowledgement of the place of the human being in the hierarchy of substances, 
Gerard says the following: 
 
I concede that the human being as inferior and contained under a body according to 
the kind of substance it is, is per se extended.  And equally I concede the point when 
we are talking about matter and the corporeal form – they are extended (together).  
But now we are talking about accidental extension which is a result of quantity (as an 
accident) and this is not the issue in hand.
119
 
 
Finally, Baconthorpe reiterates the point he is making: 
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When it is said that the soul surpasses matter as matter’s act and for the same reason 
is able to be extended along with it, I say it is only true if in an equipollent and more 
excellent way it can be the perfection of material. It can be in any part of the body 
without being extended by it. It is whole in whole and whole in each part.
120
 
 
At this point in the proceedings Baconthorpe introduces a potential objection to his 
argument from equipollence: 
 
It is possible to dispute my main point: I have been saying that these problems are 
apparently solved by equipollence. Nonetheless the principal difficulty remains: what 
in the nature of things could be such equipollence, namely that some form may be 
whole in any divided part and extended in some divisible thing without nevertheless 
the informing form being divided or extended.
121
 
 
In reply to this potential objection Baconthorpe illustrates his position using an 
analogy from geometry: that of a flowing point as the substantial form of a line.
122
 
Here the Carmelite master demonstrates, once again, the willingness of English 
thinkers to employ insights from the exact sciences within the context of 
philosophical and theological discussion: 
 
I argue that this issue is best dealt with by means of the example of a point. Let us 
suppose a point is the substantial form of a line, just as the geometers suppose that a 
flowing point causes a line. If we add to this supposition that the point in no way can 
be divided neither according to location, nor according to position, nor according to 
extension, nor in any other conceivable way, it follows that a point is a substantial 
form of the line, which is whole in the whole line.  So it is with the case in hand 
[concerning the rational soul].
123
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 Quando dicitur quod anima ita supergreditur materiam, quod est actus materiae, et eadem 
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argumenta sunt apparenter soluta per hoc, quod dictum est de aequipollentia, sed nihilominus 
remanet principalis difficultas, qualiter in rerum natura potest esse aequipollentia talis, 
videlicet qualiter est possible, quod aliqua forma sit tota in qualibet parte divisa, et extensa 
alicuius rei divisibilis, et tamen quod illa forma informans nullo modo sit divisa, aut extensa. 
(116b). 
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 Margartet Baron points to the discussion of flowing points and the forming of lines in the 
writings of Nicole Oresme (c.1320-1382) and the fourteenth-century Oxford Calculators 
among whom the terms fluxus and fluens had currency.  See M. Baron, The Origins of the 
Infitesimal Calculus (Oxford: Pergamon Press 1969), p. 84. 
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 Dico quod illud est declaratum superius per exemplum de puncto.  Supponamus enim 
quod punctus esset forma substantialis lineae (sicut supponunt Geometrae, quod punctus 
fluens causat lineam) si post addamus huic suppositione quod punctus nullo modo potest 
dividi nec secundum situm, nec secundum positionem, nec secundum extensionem, nec 
quocumque alio modo cogitabili, sequitur quod punctus sic est forma substatinalis lineae, 
quod est totus in tota linea, et totus in qualibet parte. (116b). 
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Baconthorpe concludes the first article by summarising his position on the question 
in hand. He insists in the final analysis that one can bring forward compelling 
arguments for the position that the soul is present whole and undivided in the whole 
and in each part of the human being. To seek more is, Baconthorpe asserts, to look 
for ‘a knot in a bulrush’, that is to look for a problem where there is none: 
 
Concerning the case in question, I argue that the rational soul is whole in the whole, 
and wholly undivided in each part, and unextended, this is not provable by means of 
those things which are joined with it and other substantial forms and, thus, to 
procede in a probative and affirmative way because in many things it flees the nature 
of other forms. We suppose as a matter of faith or from Philosophy or both that the 
rational soul cannot be divided neither according to location, nor according to 
position, nor according to extension, nor in any other conceivable way either by faith 
or philosophy or both. It follows, therefore, that thus is our form, that it is whole, 
undivided in each of our parts and anyone who looks for more proof in such things, is 
looking for a knot in a bulrush (nodum in scirpo).
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Article 2 
Elsewhere in his Sentences commentary Baconthorpe has extended discussion 
intended to prove the plurality thesis with regard to substantial form. In the present 
question he gives his brief article 2 over to a consideration of what kind of position 
concerning the soul and extension one would be committed to if one were to insist on 
the unicity of substantial form. He clearly has Thomas Aquinas in mind and, indeed, 
cites him explicitly. The text referred to is from Thomas’s Summa Ia, q. 76, art. 4. On 
Baconthorpe’s reading, Thomas’s insistence on identifying corporeal form and the 
rational soul as one necessitates that one introduce a kind of ‘graduated’ view of 
unique substantial form: 
 
It has to be said that although they are one form, [proponents of this view] speak 
nevertheless of different degrees (gradus) in the same form.  And so the question 
concerning the identity of the rational soul with corporeal form becomes a question 
concerning the degrees of forms and this is accepted by Thomas in the first part of his 
Summa where he addresses the question. Following this line one has to say that the 
[soul] is extended accidentally by reason of the grade of corporeity and remains 
unextended by reason of intellectuality.
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 Ad propositum dico, quod animam intellectivam esse totam in tota, et totam in qualibet 
parte indivisam, et inextensam, non potest hoc probari faciendo probationem per ea, quae 
sibi, et aliis formis substantialibus conveniunt; et sic procedere via probativa, et affirmativa, 
quia in multis fugit naturam aliarum formarum. Supponimus enim ex fide, vel ex Phylosophia, 
vel ex utraque; quod anima non potest divide nec secundum situm, nec secundum positionem, 
nec secundum extensionem, vel quocumque modo cogitabili, ut ex fide, vel ex Phylosophia 
habemus, vel ex utraque. Sequitur igitur quod sic est forma nostril, quod ipsa est totat, et 
indivisa in qualibet parte nostri: Et qui quaerit aliam declarationem in talibus, quaerit nodum 
in scirpo. (117a). 
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 Respondendum est quod licet sunt una forma, dicunt tamen diversos gradus in eadem 
forma et ideo ista quaestio de identitate intellectivae cum corporeitate consuevit vocari 
quaestio de gradibus formarum, et accipitur a Tho. prima parte Summae, ubi quaerit istam 
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This is an issue to which Baconthorpe intends to return in the future. For the 
moment he ‘holds his fire’ and refrains from pouring scorn on the Angelic doctor’s 
position. Just to note in passing that the doctrine of the real presence of the Eucharist 
makes a very brief appearance in article 2 only to be dismissed as (for the moment) 
irrelevant to the philosophical discussion in hand: Sed illud exemplum est fidei: hic 
autem loquimur physice; Igitur non valet (117a). Baconthrope is in the present text 
content to confine himself to philosophical discussion. 
 
Article 3 
It was noted earlier that Baconthorpe frequently settles an argument secundum 
Philosophum with the help of Averroes the Commentator. True to form, we find a 
classic example of Baconthorpe’s preferred way of settling an argument in article 
three of the quaestio we have been considering. The entire article, which is intended to 
settle or ‘determine’ the issue of the rational soul and spatial extension pivots around 
two extracts from Aristotle’s Physics. He will also supply some further argumentation 
from Aristotle’s De anima. The early modern editor of Baconthorpe’s text 
summarises his intent as follows: 
 
[Baconthorpe] teaches that the rational soul, as a form informing the body, is 
nevertheless not extended unto the extension of the body, whence he explains the 
demonstration of Aristotle in Book VIII of the Physics, by which he proves that 
Intelligence is not in magnitude.
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And so Baconthorpe asks: Quomodo posit anima intellectiva non extendi extensione 
corporis? (‘In what way can the rational soul not be extended unto the extension of 
the body?’).   
 True to form, Baconthorpe sets out to conclude his discussion secundum 
Philosophum but not before he admits that Aristotle puts forward an argument in 
Book VIII of his Physics (266a10; 267b19-26) that could be seen to prove that the 
rational soul is extended in the extension of the body of which it is a form. He 
summarises Aristotle’s argument in the form of a syllogism: 
 
Major: The First Intelligence (the ‘Unmoved Mover’) cannot exist in magnitude 
because then it would be dividable into parts and the whole of its very magnitude and 
thus a part in a part of magnitude would move in shorter time and the whole which 
would be in total magnitude would move in longer time. 
 
Minor: But this would not be true unless the Intelligence were extended in the 
extension of its subject, if it is its form.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
quaestionem, et secundum hoc est dicendum quod extenditur per accidens ratione gradus 
corporeitatis, et manet inextensa ratione intellectualitatis. 
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 Docet quomodo anima intellectiva, cum sit forma informans corpus, non tamen extendatur 
ad extensionem corporis, unde explicat demonstrationem Aristotelis 8. Physico, qua probat 
Intelligentiam non esse in magnitudine. (118a). 
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Conclusion: Therefore, the rational soul is extended in the extension of the body of 
which it is a form.
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Baconthorpe’s strategy in trying to circumvent this problem is, first, to draw 
attention to its status as an argument and, secondly, to suggest that Aristotle’s 
attention is directed in this case to (what Baconthorpe calls) common physical 
situations rather than to matters properly to do with First Intelligence (as First 
Intelligence). Aristotle is arguing, Baconthorpe contends, as a mere physicist (mere ut 
Physicus) and is not speaking simply and strictly (simpliciter et stricte). 
 In the first place, Baconthorpe insists that while Aristotle’s views have the 
status of an argument they do not amount to a demonstrative proof: non est 
demonstratio in rei veritate (literally: ‘it is not a demonstration in the truth of the 
thing’). Secondly, on Baconthorpe’s reading, Aristotle is speaking in this part of the 
Physics concerning common physical situations. If we were to leave things at that 
level then his argumentation would suffice to show that each form received in matter 
is extended in the extension of matter. However, for Baconthorpe, this does not 
obtain in the case of what is proper to the First Intelligence or Unmoved Mover. To 
support his reading of Aristotle at this point and to make it applicable to the human 
soul, the Carmelite master adduces two references to the De anima. In De anima II 
(414b18-20) Baconthorpe asserts that  Aristotle, dealing with the powers of the soul, 
argues that the rational soul is the form of the body and, as such, is that by which we 
primarily know. Furthermore, in De anima III (430a10-25) in that famous, enigmatic 
and textually problematic passage concerning the active and passive intellects, 
Aristotle insists (again, as Baconthorpe presents him) that the rational soul is 
unmixed, separate, incorruptible and impassible and that it does not lose its proper 
conditions when united with matter. 
 Baconthorpe concludes the article by reiterating his conviction that the 
rational soul, as a special case and when properly considered as rational, is not 
extended along with the extension of matter, although it is united with it within the 
context of the human being. Against those who would seek to deny that the rational 
soul is the form of the body on account of its being united with a material body, 
Baconthorpe argues that the rational soul, on account of its very rationality, has (and 
is to be asserted as having) a different mode of presence to other instances of form 
united with matter: 
 
I respond as before that the first consequence holds according to the common 
physical propositions, according to which if something is united with matter it is 
divided, but this does not hold according to propositions proper to Intelligence.
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 Ubi primo dubitatur circa hoc, quia 8 Physicorum, tex. comm. 78 et 86, arguit 
Phylosophus quod prima Intelligentia non potest esse in magnitudine, quia tunc posset divide 
secundum partes, et totum ipsius magnitudinis, sic quod pars in parte magnitudinis moveret 
in minori tempore, et tota, quae esset in tota magnitudine, moveret in longiori tempore. Sed 
istud non esset verum, nisi Intelligentia extenderetur extensione sui subiecti si esset forma 
eius. Igitur anima intellectiva extenditur extensione corporis, cuius est forma (118a). 
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 Respondeo ut prius quod prima consequentia tenet secundum propositiones communes 
physicas, scilicet si unitur materiae igitur dividitur, sed non tenet secundum proprias 
positiones de Intelligentia (119a). 
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Conclusion 
 
Although the best-known among the Carmelite scholastics, John Baconthorpe 
remains one of the lesser-known medieval thinkers today. In his discussion of soul, 
body and extension Baconthorpe reveals himself to be a clear-headed and methodical 
thinker, keen to engage with and contribute to the philosophical and theological 
discourse of his age. He is a dedicated proponent of the doctrine of the plurality of 
substantial form at a time and within a context when many considered it 
indispensable to philosophy and theology. Baconthorpe sees the potential in the 
doctrine for addressing the difficult question of the soul’s relationship with (and 
‘presence in’) the body. He also reflects the innovative spirit of the age in seeing the 
explanatory potential in employing logical terminology and insights from the exact 
sciences within philosophical and theological discourse; one should be reminded that 
‘philosophy’ at that time and until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ‘included’ 
all the natural sciences. Baconthorpe introduces an air of ‘pragmatism’ to the debate 
in admitting that all he can hope to provide are compelling arguments regarding the 
relationship between the body and the soul which may not ultimately satisfy the 
diehard seeker after proof. His particular discussion of soul, body and extension 
witnesses in a significant way to the wider concerns of philosophical debate in the 
fourteenth century. In addition to adding to the stock of knowledge concerning late 
medieval thought, further study of this Carmelite master’s output (along with the 
work of other fourteenth-century thinkers) should also in time pay dividends in 
enabling scholars to trace the roots of early modern philosophical discourse. 
 
 
 
  
